William & Mary Law Review Online
Volume Volume 62 (2020-2021)

Article 3

2-26-2021

The Forum-Defendant Rule, The Mischief Rule, and Snap Removal
Howard M. Wasserman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Repository Citation
Wasserman, Howard M. (2021) "The Forum-Defendant Rule, The Mischief Rule, and Snap Removal,"
William & Mary Law Review Online: Vol. 62 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol62/iss1/3

Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline

Wasserman: The Forum-Defendant Rule, The Mischief Rule, and Snap Removal

THE FORUM-DEFENDANT RULE, THE MISCHIEF RULE,
AND SNAP REMOVAL

HOWARD M. WASSERMAN*
ABSTRACT
Samuel Bray’s The Mischief Rule reconceptualizes and revitalizes
that venerable canon of statutory interpretation. Bray’s new approach to the mischief rule offers a textual solution to an ongoing
civil procedure puzzle—forum defendants and “snap removal.” The
forum-defendant rule provides that a diversity case is not removable
from state to federal court when a properly joined and served
defendant is a citizen of the forum state. Snap removal occurs when
a defendant removes before the forum defendant has been properly
served, “snapping” the case into federal court. Three courts of appeals
and a majority of district courts have endorsed this practice,
concluding that it is consistent with the unambiguous text of 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) and does not produce an absurd result, despite
contravening congressional intent that such cases remain in state
court. Bray’s reconstruction of the mischief rule offers a textual
solution—by focusing on the mischief Congress targeted with the
“properly served” language of § 1441(b)(2), courts can broadly
interpret existing statutory text to prohibit snap removal as a clever
evasion of the forum-defendant rule.

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, FIU
College of Law. Thanks to Samuel Bray, Thomas Main, James Pfander, and Adam Steinman
for comments and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
The “mischief rule” is a venerable canon of statutory interpretation, purportedly dating to Elizabethan times.1 It instructs an
interpreter to consider the problem or evil—the mischief—to which
a statute was addressed, as well as the way in which the statute
remedies that problem or evil.2 Samuel Bray’s The Mischief Rule
reconceptualizes and revitalizes a rule that purposivist defenders
and textualist critics misunderstand, creating a tool for all interpretive methodologies that allows courts to consider the targeted
mischief as a way to give meaning to specific textual language.3
Bray does not have civil procedure in mind. He focuses on
statutes involving discriminatory state taxes on railroads,4 fish as
“tangible objects” that cannot be destroyed,5 and the meaning of
“sex” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6
But his new approach to the mischief rule offers a textual solution
to an ongoing civil procedure puzzle—forum defendants and “snap
removal.”7

1. See Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript
at 13 n.52) (on file with authors).
2. Id. (manuscript at 3).
3. Id.
4. See id. (manuscript at 6) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reading of a provision of the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 in CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
Alabama Department of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277 (2011), and Alabama Department of Revenue
v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 575 U.S. 21 (2015)); see also CSX Transp., Inc., 562 U.S. at 280.
5. See Bray, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6-7) (describing the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of “tangible object” in a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in Yates v. United
States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)); see also Yates, 574 U.S. at 532.
6. See Bray, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7) (arguing that Judge Lynch’s interpretation
of the word “sex” in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc),
aff’d, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) aligned more closely with the mischief
rule than the Second Circuit majority’s reading). But see Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737-38.
7. See Arthur Hellman, Lonny Hoffman, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Joan Steinman &
Georgene Vairo, Neutralizing the Stratagem of “Snap Removal”: A Proposed Amendment to
the Judicial Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103, 103-04 (2016); Valerie M. Nannery, Closing the
Snap Removal Loophole, 86 CIN. L. REV. 541, 544-45 (2018); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O.
Main & David McClure, Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; and Cure 3-4 (May 23,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3602978 [https://perma.cc/C2JTDSHB]; see also Texas Brine Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 955 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2020);
Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2018).
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In diversity actions (those between “citizens of different States”),8
an action is not removable from state court to federal court if any
defendant “properly joined and served” is a citizen of the forum
state.9 Defendants have circumvented this limitation through “snap
removal,” where a defendant (whether forum-based or not) removes
before the forum defendant has been served.10 Three courts of
appeals11 and a majority of district courts12 have approved of the
practice. Whether approving or rejecting the move, courts adopt the
same mode of statutory interpretation. Everyone agrees snap
removal is contrary to congressional intent but consistent with and
permissible under current text.13 The language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)(2) is clear and unambiguous in allowing removal if the
forum defendant has not been served; the point of departure is
whether that result is so unreasonable or outrageous as to trigger
the “absurdity” canon as a basis to ignore the plain language of the
statute.14
Bray’s reframing of the mischief rule offers a textualist solution,
a way for courts to use mischief to understand, and thus adhere to,
the text. By focusing on the mischief Congress targeted with the
“properly joined and served” language, a court could read and
interpret the statutory language broadly to prohibit snap removal
as a clever evasion of the forum-defendant rule. The court could rely
on the text of § 1441(b)(2) to reject snap removal, without resorting
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see Hellman et al., supra note 7, at 104; Nannery, supra note
7, at 549; Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 12-14.
10. See Hellman et al., supra note 7, at 104.
11. See Texas Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 487; Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d
699, 707 (2d Cir. 2019); Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 154.
12. In a study exploring a range of variables, including aspects of the identity of the
federal judges to whom cases were removed and the subject matter of the removed cases,
researchers found that courts allowed removal (that is, declined to remand the case) in 53
percent of 193 snap removal cases sampled over 30 years. Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W.
Stempel & David McClure, The Elastics of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study of
Textualism 15 (2020), https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2333&context=
facpub [https://perma.cc/DJ2B-EMQD].
13. See, e.g., Texas Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 486-87; Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 3-4.
14. Compare Texas Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 486-87, and Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 707, and
Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 154, with Delaughder v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 360 F. Supp.
3d 1372, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2018), and Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640,
643 (D.N.J. 2008).
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to atextual interpretive modes, such as legislative purpose or
absurdity.
I. THE MISCHIEF RULE
The conventional narrative situates the mischief rule within four
historical jurisprudential moments. The first stop is Heydon’s Case,
a 1584 decision of the Court of Exchequer.15 The second is Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.16 The third is Hart
& Sacks’ The Legal Process.17 And the fourth is Justice Scalia’s
rejection of the rule18 in his book Reading Law19 and in his opinion
for the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services.20
Bray argues that each moment misunderstood the mischief rule.
Heydon’s Case is not a “manifesto for purposivism” but an instruction to not read and interpret statutes in a vacuum.21 Blackstone did
not fully separate mischief from other interpretive considerations.22
Hart and Sacks “conflate[d] the mischief rule and purposivism.”23
And working from that conflation, Scalia rejected the mischief rule
because he rejected purposivism.24 Courts and scholars “slide”
between a statute’s mischief and a statute’s purpose, using them
synonymously and interchangeably.25
But there is “daylight” between mischief and purpose.26 Mischief
or evil functions “logically prior” and external to the enactment of
the statute and its legislative purpose.27 Mischief is the preexisting
social problem that persists because existing law is insufficient to
resolve it; mischief prompts legislative action; the purpose of which

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See Bray, supra note 1 (manuscript at 12-16).
Id. (manuscript at 16-19).
Id. (manuscript at 19-20).
Id. (manuscript at 21-24).
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012).
20. See 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
21. See Bray, supra note 1 (manuscript at 14-15).
22. See id. (manuscript at 18-19).
23. Id. (manuscript at 19-20).
24. See id. (manuscript at 21-24).
25. See id. (manuscript at 26).
26. Id. (manuscript at 26).
27. Id. (manuscript at 28-29).
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is to address the mischief.28 Bray frames it as a logical progression
of mischief to legislative action to purpose: “Because of a, the action
b, so that c.”29 The mischief is a, the first logical step, an existing
social problem for which current law is deficient and to which the
statute responds.30 The legislative action is b, the response to the
mischief and to the inadequacy in existing law.31 The legislature’s
purpose or goal going forward is c.32 Whether one believes the third
step should matter (the point on which Scalia departs from Hart
and Sacks),33 pre-existing mischief represents a distinct concept and
a distinct step from statutory purpose.
So conceptualized, the mischief rule performs two textual
functions. First, it provides a rational stopping point in defining the
scope of a statutory term.34 This does not run one way; it can prompt
a court to broaden a statute or to narrow a statute.35 Either way,
mischief guides the interpreter, focuses her attention, and expresses
an intuition about what the statute should mean.36 Thus, slugs and
squirrels are not “animals” on railroad tracks for which trains must
stop, where the preexisting mischief was large livestock, such as
cows, derailing trains and causing farmers to lose valuable stock.37
Second, mischief allows courts to thwart “clever evasions” of
statutory text that perpetuate the original mischief or create new
mischief.38 Thus, “cattle” includes not only cows but other, smaller
livestock, such as sheep; this prevents ranchers from grazing
animals other than cows on Indian land without tribal consent and
from perpetuating the evil of non-permitted grazing.39

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. (manuscript at 7).
Id. (manuscript at 34-35).
Id.
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 3-4).
Id. (manuscript at 36-38).
Id. (manuscript at 37-38).
See id. (manuscript at 28, 37-38).
See id. (manuscript at 3, 40).
Id. (manuscript at 43).
Id. (manuscript at 43-44).
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II. FORUM DEFENDANTS AND SNAP REMOVAL
A. Forum Defendants
The canonical understanding is that diversity jurisdiction in
federal court—original jurisdiction over civil actions between
citizens of different states40—exists to prevent bias in favor of local
parties and against out-of-state parties.41 By placing these cases
before Article III judges with life tenure and guaranteed salary,42
Congress insulated litigation from localized passions and prejudices
that advantage insiders and disadvantage outsiders.43 Congress
further recognized that outsiders need that federal option regardless
of their position in civil litigation. It thus allows plaintiffs to avoid
bias by filing diversity cases in federal court in the first instance44
and allows defendants to avoid bias by removing diversity cases to
federal court when the plaintiff files in state court.45
But the policy and logic of diversity jurisdiction gives rise to a
limitation on removal in diversity cases—the forum-defendant
rule.46 If an out-of-state plaintiff sues a defendant in a state court of
that defendant’s state, removal is unnecessary to further the
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The forum defendant does not
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
41. See Scott Dodson, Beyond Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 69 DUKE L.J. 267, 283-84, 287
(2019); Richard D. Freer, The Political Reality of Diversity Jurisdiction, 94 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4-6) (on file with author); Stempel et al., supra note 7, at
6-7; Howard M. Wasserman, A Jurisdictional Perspective on New York Times v. Sullivan, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 901, 906 (2013); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85 (2010); Bank
of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., 919 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 2019).
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
43. Freer, supra note 41 (manuscript at 5-6, 9-10); Wasserman, supra note 41, at 906. But
see Dodson, supra note 41, at 296-97.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(a).
46. See Hellman et al., supra note 7, at 104; Main et al., supra note 12, at 4-5; Stempel et
al., supra note 7, at 12; see also Texas Brine Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 955 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir.
2020); Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018).
Chief Justice William Rehnquist supported an unsuccessful proposal for a forum-plaintiff rule
that would have limited diversity jurisdiction by prohibiting plaintiffs from filing diversity
actions in federal court in their home states. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 YearEnd Report on the Federal Judiciary, 24 THIRD BRANCH 1, 3 (1992).

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021

7

William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 62 [2021], Art. 3

58

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 62:051

need the protections of the federal forum to avoid being “hometowned,”47 as any state-court bias runs in her favor.48 If a nonforum
plaintiff wants to take her chances litigating on the defendant’s
home court, that is her choice. This intersection with anti-bias
concerns explains why Congress limited the forum-defendant rule
to diversity actions, while federal question cases are removable by
any party.49 Federal jurisdiction over federal claims serves distinct
purposes of ensuring uniformity, expertise, and solicitude in
resolving questions of federal law;50 those interests require a federal
forum for all defendants who want one, regardless of citizenship.
In 1948, Congress established the framework for the forumdefendant rule. A diversity action “shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants
is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”51 In 2011,
Congress amended the statute to provide that a diversity action
“may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State which such action
is brought.”52 The amendment shifts the starting point—from
“removable only if something is not true” to “not removable if
something is true.”53 But the basic textual point remains—removal
is barred only if the forum defendant has been properly served.
Congress has not explained the addition or retention of the proper
service requirement, but scholars and lower courts have developed
an explanatory history. In 1939, the Supreme Court in Pullman Co.
v. Jenkins remanded an action that had been removed by an
unserved Doe defendant, later identified as a forum citizen, who
destroyed complete diversity.54 Pullman handed plaintiffs a tool to
stop removal. A plaintiff in an action targeting nonforum defendants
could include as a nominal defendant a diverse “strawman” forum
47. See Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 2019); Dodson,
supra note 41, at 287; Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 12.
48. Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319 (D. Mass. 2013); Stempel et al.,
supra note 7, at 12.
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1441(b)(2).
50. Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 97 (2009).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (1948) (amended 2002).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2011).
53. Compare § 1441(b)(2) (1948), with § 1441(b)(2) (2011).
54. See 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939); Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 15.
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citizen against whom the plaintiff did not intend to proceed and
whom she did not bother serving, keeping that defendant in the
action solely to prevent removal.55
The “properly served” language blocks that gamesmanship,
limiting the forum-defendant rule to cases in which the plaintiff
serves the forum defendant, thereby demonstrating some intent to
pursue that party. If the forum defendant is not served, the forumdefendant limitation does not apply and the action is removable.
Through this text, Congress prevents a plaintiff from frustrating the
statutory removal rights of the nonforum defendants—the real
targets of the litigation—by adding an unserved forum defendant
who remains a nominal-but-not-practical part of the litigation.
B. Snap Removal
But halting plaintiff gamesmanship enabled defendant gamesmanship via “snap removal.”56 Snap removal occurs when a defendant removes the action before the plaintiff has served the forum
defendant or even had a meaningful opportunity to serve the forum
defendant.57 Jeffrey Stempel, Thomas Main, and David McClure
identify two snap-removal scenarios.58 In the first, a resourced
repeat player defendant monitors state court dockets, identifies
lawsuits when they are filed against it, and immediately removes
before any service occurs.59 In the second (which they label “snappish” removal), a plaintiff serves at least one nonforum defendant
and removal occurs before the plaintiff can complete service on any
forum defendant.60 The second category includes a Third Circuit
case in which a plaintiff requested a service waiver from the sole
defendant, a forum citizen; tipped to the lawsuit, that defendant
declined to waive service and removed.61 In either scenario, the
55. Hellman et al., supra note 7, at 108; Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 15-16; see also
Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644-45 (D.N.J. 2008).
56. Other terms for the practice include “pre-service removal,” “early removal,” “jack
rabbit removal,” “race to remove,” “preemptive removal,” “snatch and remove,” and “wrinkle
removal.” Main et al., supra note 12, at 6 n.20.
57. Id. at 5-6.
58. Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 17-19.
59. Id. at 17-18.
60. Id. at 18-19.
61. See, e.g., Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir.
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defendant snaps the case into federal court before the forum defendant can be served.
For a time, a different piece of plaintiff gamesmanship arguably
justified snap removal—what Valerie Nannery calls the “courtesy
copy trap.”62 A plaintiff would provide a defendant with an informal
courtesy copy of the complaint but would not serve (perhaps in
anticipation of settlement negotiations); she then would argue that
the thirty-day period for removal63 had lapsed thirty days from the
plaintiff ’s receipt of the courtesy copy, regardless of whether or
when the defendant had been served.64 Snap removal emerged as a
necessary counter to that strategy. The defendant must be able to
remove prior to service, lest the plaintiff provide a courtesy copy but
delay service for thirty days, effectively denying any defendant the
right to remove. The Supreme Court stopped this game, holding that
the thirty-day removal period runs from formal service, not from
other, informal receipt of the complaint.65
With no thirty-day clock running prior to service, defendants are
not in that bind and have no defensive reason to snap-remove.
Nevertheless, pre-service snap removal continues, converted to an
offensive strategy to jump to federal court despite the presence of a
forum defendant. Courts of appeals have approved the strategy,
whether executed by a nonforum defendant66 or by a forum defendant that is the lone target of the action.67 District courts are
divided on this issue, but the majority allow removal.68
Courts follow the same analytical path to either conclusion. The
text of § 1441(b)(2) is clear and unambiguous. An action “may not be
removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is

2018); see also Nannery, supra note 7, at 550 (arguing that the earliest example of snap
removal came in response to service of courtesy copies).
62. Nannery, supra note 7, at 550 n.48, 584.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
64. See Nannery, supra note 7, at 550-51, 550 n.48, 551 n.54; see also Murphy Bros. v.
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1999).
65. See Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 352-53, 356.
66. See, e.g., Texas Brine Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 955 F.3d 482, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2020).
67. See, e.g., Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 149-50, 15354 (3d Cir. 2018).
68. See supra note 12.
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brought,”69 which means the action may be removed so long as the
forum defendant has not been properly joined and served.70 This
clear and unambiguous language must control and must be read to
mean what it says.
Plaintiffs resort to the “absurdity canon,” under which a court can
ignore unambiguous language to avoid an absurd result.71 An
absurd result is one that is “preposterous” or that “no reasonable
person could intend,”72 or that “defies rationality or renders the
statute nonsensical and superfluous.”73 A court can find absurdity
“where it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the
result and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious
to most anyone.”74 A mere oddity is not sufficient.75 Courts approving snap removal characterize the practice as peculiar but not
irrational or without purpose—that is, not absurd. According to the
Second Circuit, the “properly joined and served” language provides
an administrable bright-line rule, saving the court from the difficult
inquiry into the plaintiff ’s intent to serve the forum defendant.76
According to the Third Circuit, the text expands defendants’
removal rights only in limited circumstances, so it is not inconsistent with Congress’s underlying goal of not allowing removal in
forum-defendant cases.77
C. Solving Snap Removal
Snap removal runs contrary to congressional intent, a workaround that undermines the statutory forum-defendant rule.78 The
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
70. See Texas Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 486; Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d
699, 705 (2d Cir. 2019); Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 152; see also Hellman et al., supra
note 7, at 105-06.
71. See, e.g., Delaughder v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 360 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1379-81 (N.D. Ga.
2018).
72. Texas Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 486 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 19, at 237).
73. Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 152 (quoting United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255,
259 (3d Cir. 2013)).
74. Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 705-06 (quoting Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc. v. Env’t. Prot. Agency, 846 F.3d 492, 517 (2d Cir. 2017)).
75. See Texas Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 486.
76. See Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 706.
77. See Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 153-54.
78. See, e.g., Hellman et al., supra note 7, at 107-08; Main et al., supra note 12, at 6;
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“and served” language is the “tail ... wag[ging] the larger dog,” with
no indication Congress wanted it to do such work.79 Congress in
1948 wanted to strip plaintiffs of a strategy to defeat removal, but
it wanted to maintain—rather than undermine—the limitation on
removal in forum-defendant cases.80
But the clarity and unambiguity of § 1441(b)(2) (at least according
to the courts) mean judicial interpretation or construction cannot
offer the solution. Congress must solve the problem by amending
the removal statutes.81
Commentators have proposed three legislative solutions. All seek
to restore the balance, and all make sense as a policy matter—an
action with a forum defendant should not be easily or quickly
removable unless it is clear that the forum defendant is a strawman
against whom the plaintiff does not intend to pursue claims.
1. More Time to Serve
Stempel, Main, and McClure propose two changes to § 1441(b)(2).
First, they eliminate the “and served” language, so the bar to
removal attaches when the forum defendant is “properly joined” in
the lawsuit.82 Second, they add a sentence at the end of the subsection: “If no defendant who is a citizen of the forum state is served
within 120 days of commencement of the action, removal may be
sought within the time period provided by Section 1446.”83
This change gives the plaintiff a period certain to serve the forum
defendant, during which time the action is not removable.84 It
establishes a “controlling presumption” that a plaintiff who intends
to pursue a defendant will serve within 120 days; if she has not done
so, the logical inference is that the unserved forum defendant is not
a real target of the litigation.85 The action becomes removable

Nannery, supra note 7, at 574-75; Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 32-33.
79. Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 41.
80. See id. at 40.
81. Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 154; Hellman et al., supra note 7, at 108.
82. Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 52.
83. Id. at 52-53.
84. See id. at 52.
85. Id.
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because that forum defendant’s presence in the action should not
defeat non-forum defendants’ removal rights.
Both elements of the proposal are necessary to resolve the
problem of snap removal. Repealing “and served” returns to the pre1948 status quo, in which plaintiffs could undermine removal by
naming, but not serving, a non-target forum defendant.86 Allowing
removal if service does not occur by a fixed time is necessary to
protect nonforum defendants’ removal rights.87
2. Post-Removal Service and Remand
Arthur Hellman and his co-authors attack the problem by
amending § 1447, which establishes the process for plaintiffs to
remand following removal. Following removal, the plaintiff can
move to remand the action to state court within thirty days of
removal for procedural defects and any time if the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction.88 Hellman’s proposal allows
defendants to continue the practice of snap-removing before the
forum defendant has been served.89 But it allows the plaintiff to continue attempting to serve the forum defendant after removal.90 If
the plaintiff serves the forum defendant within the service period under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (currently ninety
days),91 the plaintiff can move to remand, citing the presence of a
now properly served forum defendant as the reason the case was
not removable and must be remanded.92
Hellman and his co-authors argue that this process will deter
snap removal. Defendants will recognize the futility of yanking the
case into federal court only to have it remanded once the plaintiff
takes its time and effects service.93 Moreover, a Notice of Removal
is subject to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;94 a
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 53.
See id.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
See Hellman et al., supra note 7, at 108.
See id. at 108-09.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
See Hellman et al., supra note 7, at 108-10.
Id. at 109.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
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defendant could face sanctions for improper removal for snapping
the case to federal court knowing the case includes a forum
defendant who the plaintiff has additional time to serve. The threat
of sanctions might further deter removal.
3. Limiting Removal to Served Defendants
James Pfander and Kevin Clermont offer the “cleanest” solution
by targeting the beginning of the removal process. Currently,
§ 1446(a) allows removal by “[a] defendant or defendants.”95 Pfander
and Clermont propose that Congress limit removal to a “properly
served defendant or defendants,”96 meaning only a served defendant
could remove the action.97
This proposal targets the first category of snap removal,98 in
which a defendant monitors state court dockets and removes as soon
as it sees an action filed against it, prior to service.99 That lurking
defendant cannot remove because it has not been served. This
proposal also resolves that anomalous case in which the sole
defendant was a forum citizen who learned of the lawsuit via email
communications with plaintiff ’s counsel, refused to waive service,
and removed before the plaintiff could take the next steps of
service.100 Prohibiting preservice removal renders the action
nonremovable before the lone defendant is served, even if it knows
of the lawsuit; the forum-defendant rule renders the action
nonremovable once that lone forum-citizen defendant has been
served.
Snap (or at least snappish) removal might remain possible in an
action involving one forum defendant (D1) and one nonforum
defendant (D2). If the plaintiff serves D2, D2 could remove as a
properly served defendant under amended § 1446(b)(2); the forum95. Id.
96. See Examining the Use of “Snap” Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. 11-12 (2019) (statement of James E. Pfander, Professor of Law,
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law) [hereinafter Pfander Testimony].
97. See id.; see also Nannery, supra note 7, at 580-81.
98. Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 17-18.
99. See Pfander Testimony, supra note 96, at 3-4.
100. Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 149-50 (3d Cir. 2018).
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defendant rule of § 1441(b)(2) imposes no barrier because the forum
defendant has not been properly served.101 But the plaintiff controls
the timing and order of service. A plaintiff wanting to keep the case
in state court can serve D1 first, rendering the action nonremovable
under the forum-defendant rule, regardless of when D2 is served.102
III. MISCHIEF RULE AS A SOLUTION TO SNAP REMOVAL
Bray’s reconceptualization of the mischief rule offers a unique and
elegant solution to the problem of snap removal. Importantly, it
resolves the problem under the current text of § 1441(b)(2), without
pressing courts to look beyond unambiguous statutory text and
without requiring congressional action to amend statutory text.
Prior to 1948 and with the Court’s decision in Pullman, plaintiffs
took advantage of the forum-defendant rule by suing strawman
forum defendants to undermine nonforum defendants’ rights to
remove.103 Congress responded to that evil by adding the “properly
... served” language.104 As amended in 2011, § 1441(b)(2) forbids
removal “if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served
as defendants” are citizens of the forum state.105
Recall Bray’s logical progression of mischief—“Because of a, the
action b, so that c.”106 Because plaintiffs included unserved
strawman forum defendants and existing law did not stop the
practice (a), Congress limited the bar on removal to forum defendants properly joined and served (b), so that plaintiffs could not
frustrate non-forum defendants’ right to remove by adding a forum
defendant for show (c). But that mischief (a) is not implicated where
the forum defendant is not a strawman—that is, where the plaintiff
intends to serve and proceed against the forum defendant— but
where the plaintiff has neither had a full opportunity to serve nor
run out of time to do so. The original forum-defendant rule and the
policy underlying diversity jurisdiction demonstrate that Congress

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See Pfander Testimony, supra note 96, at 11-12.
See id.; see also Nannery, supra note 7, at 583.
See Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 15.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
Bray, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7).
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wanted this case to remain in state court.107 The legislative action
(b) thus should not apply in a case with a genuine forum defendant
because the action would not address or cure the targeted evil.
Bray’s mischief rule thwarts clever evasions of legal rules by
focusing judicial analysis on the preexisting underlying evil and
interpreting statutory text in light of and as a response to that
evil.108 Snap removal represents such a clever evasion of the general
prohibition on removal in forum-defendant cases. By focusing on the
preexisting evil of strawman forum defendants, courts use the
mischief rule to understand § 1441(b)(2) as a response to that evil,
inapplicable where the evil does not come into play.
A court might apply the mischief rule to interpret “properly joined
and served as defendants” to mean properly served or with time
remaining to properly serve. This interpretation modestly broadens
§ 1441(b)(2) to preclude removal not only when the plaintiff has
properly served the forum defendant but also as long as time remains for the plaintiff to properly serve the forum defendant. That
is, removal of the action is barred until it becomes legally impossible
for the forum defendant to be properly served.
By modestly broadening “properly” to grant the plaintiff the
entire service period, a court focuses the statute on the unique
mischief to which Congress responded—plaintiffs naming strawman
forum defendants with no intent to serve—while eliminating snap
removal as a clever evasion of the forum-defendant rule. Where
there is no doubt the plaintiff intends to pursue the forum defendant (such as where the forum citizen is the lone defendant)109 but
the plaintiff needs time to serve, the evil against which Congress
legislated is not implicated, so the “properly served” language
should not apply to allow removal. If the plaintiff serves the forum
defendant within the time allowed, it shows she was not engaged in
the targeted mischief, so the “properly served” language should not
apply to allow removal. If the plaintiff fails to serve within the
allotted period, it suggests she was engaged in the targeted

107. Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 8, 17; see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
108. See Bray, supra note 1 (manuscript at 43-44).
109. See, e.g., Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 149-50 (3d
Cir. 2018).
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mischief; that forum defendant has not been “properly served” and
the statute should apply to allow removal.
The mischief interpretation reaches the same conclusion as
Stempel, Main, and McClure.110 An action with a forum defendant
remains nonremovable upon service of the forum defendant or prior
to expiration of some period during with the plaintiff can serve the
forum defendant. That action becomes removable when that time
lapses without service on the forum defendant.
But the mischief rule gets there through a mode of textual
analysis, guiding the court in interpreting text without resort to
extra-textual considerations. Main, Stempel, and McClure argue
that snap removal presents a pure choice between textualism and
purposivism, because “applications of this statute require either a
hyper-literal reading that flouts Congressional intent or a purposive
reading that evades crystal-clear text,” with no middle ground.111
And only an extreme form of purposivism can avoid the plain text
of § 1441(b)(2)—“there is not even a strained reading of the text for
the purposivist to use as a fig leaf to hide behind.”112 Courts agree
that clear text compels snap removal; the dispute is whether
purpose or absurdity can or should override that clear text, with
some courts concluding it does and remanding113 while most courts
conclude it does not.114
Bray’s mischief rule offers that nonstrained textual reading. By
balancing the preexisting unremedied evil that Congress targeted
with the “properly served” language with the legislative goal of
keeping forum-defendant diversity cases out of federal court
(because they present no threat of anti-outsider bias), a court can
resolve the snap-removal problem under the current text of
§ 1441(b)(2). The unadorned language of § 1441(b)(2) produces an
incoherent result,115 demonstrating that it is “hard—too hard in our
view—to displace even unintended or unwise application of

110. See supra Part II.C.1.
111. Main, et al., supra note 12, at 6.
112. Id. at 6-7.
113. See Delaughder v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 360 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2018);
Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643 (D.N.J. 2008).
114. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
115. See Main et al., supra note 12, at 7.
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statutory language.”116 By adding preexisting mischief to the textual analysis, Bray offers a textualist path out of the snap-removal
absurdity. Courts can reach the outcome most consistent with obvious congressional intent, while relying on plain text justified by a
venerable interpretive canon properly reframed and understood.
This approach thus satisfies even the most committed (or rigid)117
textualists.118
This approach also gets there without congressional intervention.
It avoids the risk of “legislative inertia”—the difficulty of initiating
and sustaining the legislative machinery to enact new laws, even
when there is no opposition or resistance to the proposed legal
changes.119 It avoids the specific difficulty of getting Congress to
legislate to override judicial decisions.120 And it avoids the more
specific congressional reluctance to legislate on civil procedure
and jurisdiction, where past efforts to clarify the law have produced
new confusion and triggered new criticism.121 Inertia presents a
special burden in this area; the complexity, nuance, and moving
pieces of the removal puzzle may frustrate legislators forced to
choose among competing solutions and fearing unintended consequences. Applying Bray’s mischief rule to § 1441(b)(2) allows
courts and current text to do the work, solving the snap-removal
problem while obviating the need for legislative action.

116. Stempel et al., supra note 7, at 35.
117. See Main et al., supra note 12, at 6-7.
118. See Bray, supra note 1 (manuscript at 50).
119. Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Unintended Legislative Inertia 11 (May 29, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3574126 [https://perma.cc/D4XP-3YDQ].
120. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319-20
(2014); Deborah A. Widiss, Identifying Congressional Overrides Should Not Be This Hard, 92
TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 145, 146-47 (2014).
121. See, e.g., William Baude, Clarification Needed: Fixing the Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 35-36 (2012); Richard D. Freer,
Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 446 (1991); James E. Pfander, The Simmering Debate
Over Supplemental Jurisdiction, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1209-10.
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CONCLUSION
Samuel Bray argues that his reframed mischief rule has “something to offer to a wide array of interpreters,”122 textualist and nontextualist. It thus has something to offer as a judicial solution to the
problem of snap removal, an absurd-if-clever legal evasion running
contrary to congressional intent reflected in the forum-defendant
rule. Bray’s approach awaits judicial adoption but need not await
congressional engagement.

122. Bray, supra note 1 (manuscript at 51).
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